The main unso amenited – and potentially politically viable – amendments that have been tabled for the report phase are the amendments put forward by Conservative Jonathan Djanogly. Mr. Djanogly was one of the most active MPs who advocated for better parliamentary oversight of trade agreements in the previous and current procedures of the Trade Act, but he was not on the Public Committee of the Law for either of the two bills. The proposed new procedure would also be too late for the signing of the 20 succession agreements already signed by the United Kingdom, but it would capture those that have yet to be concluded. There are some advantages to this argument. However, since the Trade Act has not yet been handed over to the House of Lords, it would be able to refine the application of the new procedure proposed by the new paragraph 4. (For example, the parliamentary report on any successor agreement could be presented if the text of the treaty is ready to be signed, not after, with selected committees being able to decide whether the agreement merits debate and a decision before signing, and the government is able to express itself if it wishes to encourage them to implement it and ratify it carefully.) v) « Trade law is only about successor agreements, not trade agreements with new partners. » The signing of trade agreements is a form of law. Members need to know through their mailboxes that this is a politically charged and important legal form for businesses and their constituents. And for the UK, the power to make such deals for itself is one of the most important and far-reaching consequences of Brexit, which requires MPs to tighten their control accordingly.

However, if there are good reasons to reform a process in the wake of Brexit, it seems to be treaty control – certainly with regard to free trade agreements. In the current trade law, the government has retained some amendments, but not others, which it admitted during the procedure for the 2017-19 bill. Some of the amendments that Mr Djanogly is introducing today would restore the amendments that were made during the 2017-19 Bill procedure and are not maintained in their current form. These include a reduction in the duration of delegated powers granted to ministers for the implementation of « succession » (or « continuity »- trade agreements; and the legal obligation for the government to publish « parliamentary reports » on the UK`s succession agreements to determine where they differ from their predecessors in the EU. In any event, the government has issued such reports on the basis of the 2017-19 cancelled bill, and says it will continue to do so without the demand for acidification presiding. However, the introduction of the practice into legislation would enhance clarity and security. A test would be whether the UK was able to negotiate the withdrawal agreement with the EU more effectively before or after the House of Commons finally had a chance to voice its opposition to the original Northern Ireland protocol when it accepted the « Brady amendment » of a motion in January 2019. With respect to the Current Contracting Practice of the United Kingdom, it was highly unusual for the House of Commons to have been able to issue an opinion on a treaty before the treaty was signed.